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China is the world’s second largest economy and the largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide, yet we know little about environmental proactivity in the most populated 
country in the world. We address this gap through a survey of 161 Chinese companies 
with two respondents per firm (N = 322) where we seek to identify the antecedents 
and consequences of environmental proactivity. We identify two categorizations of 
environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements and 
environmental reporting. We find that ecological motivations and regulatory 
stakeholder pressure are positively related to both types of environmental proactivity, 
and external stakeholder pressure is negatively related to environmental reporting. 
Furthermore, we find that (1) if a firm is environmentally proactive (as it relates to 
either measure) and they are ecologically motivated, there is a positive and significant 
cost advantage, and (2) if a firm makes use of environmental operational 
improvement and they are competitively motivated, there is a positive and significant 
reputation advantage. Implications for researchers, managers, and policy-makers in 
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Is the Red Dragon Green? An Examination of the Antecedents and 
Consequences of Environmental Proactivity in China 
 
 We are now undoubtedly witnessing the dramatic ecological effects of the 
industrial revolution which include but are not limited to climate change, 
deforestation, depleted and polluted oceans and fresh water, and unprecedented losses 
in biodiversity (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). Scientists and policy makers have warned 
that we are now entering the sixth great extinction since the birth of the planet, the last 
of which occurred during the reign of the dinosaurs in the late cretaceous period 
(Gore, 2009). Unlike the past, however, where natural events such as asteroid 
collisions or naturally occurring climate change were to blame, today, the blame rests 
primarily with humans. The anthropogenic causes of our current ecological state are 
garnering increasing attention within academia, and because organizations are a major 
contributing factor, management scholars have increasingly turned their attention to 
this important area (Berchicci and King, 2007; Lockett, Moon and Visser, 2006; 
Starik, 2006).  
In this study, we investigate proactive environmental strategies, meaning 
strategies “that seek to reduce the environmental impacts of operations beyond 
regulatory requirements” (Delmas, Hoffman, and Kuss, 2011: 119). In particular, our 
research focuses on the antecedents (i.e., managerial motivations and stakeholder 
pressures) and consequences (i.e., cost advantages, reputation and innovation) of 
environmental proactivity in China.  
To date, research examining environmental proactivity has tended to 
investigate Western societies (e.g., Darnall, Henriques and Sadorsky, 2010; Delmas 
and Toffel, 2008; Rueda-Manzanares, Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2008). 
Consequently, current management research in the area does not adequately reflect 
the emergence of developing countries as major players in the world economy. 





Similarly, research examining the more general corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
area has overwhelmingly focused on developed markets (Gao, 2009; Ip, 2008). This 
focus is not consistent with the economic growth we have seen in emerging markets. 
We believe that a close examination on environmental proactivity and its antecedents 
in different institutional contexts is important given the global economy and global 
environmental problems that require contingent solutions. For example, the 
antecedents and consequences of environmental proactivity may be different in China 
versus the United States or other Western countries. As the second largest economy in 
the world and the largest emerging market, China, is of particular interest (Ye and 
Zhang, 2011). Despite China’s tremendous economic growth, we know little of its 
growth as it relates to CSR and environmental responsibility specifically (Gao, 2009). 
As the largest carbon emitter in the world and a country that burns twice as much coal 
as the United States (Gore, 2009) the dearth of academic research examining the 
environmental performance of China represents a large gap in the literature. 
Furthermore, it is important to investigate environmental proactivity in China 
to supplement our understanding and conceptualization of this complex construct. In 
particular, we need to study it in different contexts to see how it may, or may not be, 
contingent on a particular institutional environment. Furthermore, China presents an 
interesting context to study environmental proactivity because of the need to balance 
tremendous economic growth with equally tremendous environmental damage. As an 
example of the latter, Chinese officials currently estimate that approximately 700,000 
people die annually in China from causes related to poor environmental conditions 
(Time, March 25, 2013). All economies must balance a desire for continuous growth 
with the recognition of limited resources in a finite planet. China represents a 
dramatic example where this need for balance is highly visible. Lastly, researchers 





have increasingly found that environmental management is not a universal 
prescription or a one-size-fits-all approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and King, 2007; 
Brammer and Millington, 2008). Given the significantly different context in China 
versus most Western societies, we can reasonably expect differences in their 
environmental proactivity. 
 To examine the antecedents and consequences from a proactive environmental 
approach in China we surveyed 161 companies in the province of Sichuan with two 
representatives per firm—the environmental manager and a top executive—for a total 
of 322 respondents. We found that an ecological motivation and regulatory 
stakeholder pressures were positively related to environmental proactivity, and 
external stakeholder pressures were negatively related to environmental proactivity. 
We also found that an ecological motivation was necessary to gain a perceived cost 
competitive advantage from environmental proactivity, and that a competitive 
motivation was necessary to gain a perceived reputation competitive advantage from 
environmental proactivity. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature 
specific to the variables in our study model. Second, we develop hypotheses to (1) 
explain environmental proactivity related to motivations and stakeholder pressures, 
and (2) determine the relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive 
advantage. Third, we describe our methodology and results. Lastly, before 
concluding, we present our discussion, and the implications and limitations in our 
study.   
Literature Review 
 Proactive environmental strategies exist beyond what is required by law 
(Delmas et al., 2011; Sharma 2000). Such strategies seek to minimize a corporation’s 





negative environmental impacts and perhaps even improve current environmental 
conditions. Environmental proactivity is often demonstrated through environmental 
operational improvements (e.g, waste reduction, closed-loop systems, life-cycle 
analysis, employee training) and environmental reporting (e.g., internal and external 
accounting procedures, environmental indicators and goals, sustainability reports) 
(Darnall et al. 2010; Delmas et al. 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997; 
Welford, 1998). We accordingly examine two types of environmental proactivity: 
operational improvements and environmental reporting. 
 In their comprehensive qualitative study Bansal and Roth (2000) identified 
three environmental motivations: competitive, legitimation and ecological 
responsibility. A competitive motivation stems from a desire to further an 
organization’s competitiveness and profitability. A legitimation motivation stems 
from a desire to be perceived as legitimate by stakeholders. Lastly, an ecological 
motivation stems from a desire to protect the natural environment. We view a 
legitimacy motivation as very similar to a competitive motivation, in that the desire 
for legitimacy is ultimately a desire to enhance the competitiveness of the 
organization. We, therefore, include the legitimation motivation as part of the 
competitive motivation where an organization seeks to further their competitiveness 
and profitability. 
While the importance of each type of motivation is likely to vary based on the 
context, we anticipate that these motivations identified in a Western context will still 
apply in China. In particular, Chinese managers are just as likely as Western 
managers to be attracted to environmental proactivity because of the potential of a 
competitive advantage (a competitive or legitimation motivation) or because they care 





for the natural environment (ecological motivation). Accordingly, we seek to measure 
both types of motivation in our study. 
The literature identifies a second common motivation for the adoption of 
proactive environmental strategies, stakeholder pressures. Researchers have found 
that proactive environmental strategies are related to perceived stakeholder pressure 
from regulators (Delmas and Montes-Sanchez, 2010; Delmas and Montiel, 2008; 
Majumdar and Marcus, 2001) and external stakeholders (Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas, 
2001; Hart, 2005; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Sharma and Henriques, 
2005). Similarly, given the Chinese context of our research we focus on these two 
particular groups of stakeholders. Researchers have found that in the adoption of CSR 
practices of firms within China, both internal (i.e., employees) and societal 
stakeholders (i.e., general public, NGOs, unions, etc.) yield little power (Lin, 2010; 
Liu et al., 2010; Tsoi, 2010). We accordingly limit our investigation to external and 
regulatory stakeholders, although as we state in our methodology, we do include other 
stakeholder groups to confirm they are not applicable to our study context.  
Extant research in China mainly focuses on the role of regulators or political 
influence in determining firms’ environmental strategies or performance. This focus 
stems from the traditional perspective of the ‘state-led’ pseudo market of China where 
government plays a significant role in shaping corporate behaviors (Francesch-
Huidobro, Lo, and Tang, 2012; Lo and Fryxell, 2005; Lo, Fryxell, and Van Rooij, 
2009; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Tang, Lo and Fryxell, 2003; Tao and Mah, 2009; Van 
Rooij, 2006). Nevertheless, studies that also investigate motivations or the role of 
other types of stakeholders have started to emerge (e.g., Liu et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 
2008; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai, 2007). For example, Zhang et al. (2008) found that 
regulatory pressure was not statistically related to the corporate environmental 





management performance of their sampled firms. They further argued that this was 
because firms in the studied region, Jiangsu Province in China, have achieved basic 
compliance to local environmental standards and laws. In contrast, Zhu et al. (2007) 
evidenced the influence of both regulatory and market pressures on the adoption of 
green supply chain management (GSCM) by Chinese automobile supply chain 
enterprises.  
Examining the consequences to environmental proactivity, research has 
moved beyond a simple examination of the effects on profitability to more specific 
competitive advantages (Berchicci and King, 2007). Similarly, in this study we 
examine competitive advantages manifested through costs, reputation and innovation 
(Delmas et al., 2011). While competitive advantages to environmental proactivity 
have been well documented in Western contexts (e.g., Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; 
Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Miles and Covin, 2000; 
Rooney, 1993; Russo and Fouts, 1997), we know of no research that has empirically 
examined the relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive 
advantage in the largest emerging market, China (Ye and Zhang, 2011). 
 In this study we expand on previous literature by examining environmental 
proactivity within China. Yet our study is more than a reliability test of previous 
research applied to a different study context. Not only do we adapt our variables and 
hypotheses to the specific study context to enhance relevance, but we also 
consistently find differences in the antecedents and consequences of environmental 
proactivity in China versus that of Western countries. This furthers our 
conceptualization of environmental proactivity and supports the contention that 
environmental management is not a universal prescription or a one-size-fits-all 
approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008).  






To garner an understanding of environmental proactivity in China we seek to 
understand the antecedents to greater proactivity and the consequences. Specifically, 
we examine motivations for environmental proactivity and stakeholder pressures as 
antecedents, and competitive advantage through cost advantages, reputation and 
innovation as consequences. Figure 1 represents our study model. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Motivation and Environmental Proactivity 
 Bansal and Roth (2000) state that it is important to understand the motives for 
environmental proactivity for two reasons. The first is limited to organizational 
theorists who can use this understanding to predict when such behaviour is likely to 
occur. The second is broader with implications for researchers, managers, and 
governments who can learn how to foster environmentally proactive organizations. 
 Given such implications, it is not surprising that a number of researchers have 
investigated reasons for environmental proactivity. Researchers have found that 
organizational champions pushing for a more proactive environmental approach 
(Andersson and Bateman, 2000), regulations (Marcus and Geffen, 1998; Majumdar 
and Marcus, 2001), financial benefits (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt 
and Rynes, 2003), and managerial cognitions including interpretations of 
environmental issues as threats or opportunities (Ghobadian et al., 1995; Lee and 
Rhee, 2007; Sharma, 2000) can all influence a firm’s environmental approach. 
 In their detailed qualitative analysis Bansal and Roth (2000) identified three 
main motivations for environmental proactivity: competitiveness, legitimation and 





ecological responsibility. Competitiveness represents the belief that environmental 
proactivity will improve long-term profitability. Legitimation represents the belief 
that environmental proactivity will enable firms to attain the necessary resources, 
reduce uncertainty, and ultimately enhance their survivability (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Lastly, ecological responsibility represents the belief 
that environmental proactivity is the right thing to do from a moral and ethical 
standpoint. As stated above, we combined the competitiveness and legitimation 
motivations as we viewed the ultimate end to these motives to be increased 
competitiveness. 
 We sought to examine to what extent these two types of motivation were 
influential in determining the environmental proactivity of Chinese firms. Given that 
Bansal and Roth (2000) qualitatively identified these types of motivations as 
determinants of greater environmental responsibility, we predict a positive 
relationship between each type and environmental proactivity. 
 We believe this is particularly applicable within China because Chinese firms 
are increasingly incorporating environmental management into their overall corporate 
social responsibility practices, primarily because of influences from the different 
levels of Chinese governments and external parties from developed countries (Lai and 
Wong, 2012; Lo et al. 2009; Sarkis, Ni and Zhu, 2011; Tang et al., 2003; Yuan, Bi 
and Moriguichi, 2006). Similarly, more and more Chinese firms link such practices to 
their economic analysis or personal moral requirements (Wang and Qian, 2011).  
 A competitive motivation stems from a belief that a firm can gain a 
competitive advantage through an environmental proactive strategy. Indeed, research 
has found that environmental proactivity can reduce costs by lowering compliance 
costs, reducing or avoiding legal liabilities, reducing waste, and improving efficiency 





and productivity (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; 
Rooney, 1993). It may improve legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and 
strengthen a firm’s reputation (Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000). It may also lead 
to the development of new market opportunities and better access to markets (Ambec 
and Lanoie, 2008), product differentiation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995), and the selling of pollution control technology (Ambec and Lanoie, 
2008). With so many potential advantages to an environmentally proactive approach, 
a desire for greater competiveness can lead to environmental proactivity.  
H1: A competitiveness motivation will be positively related to environmental  
proactivity. 
 
 In addition, managers may simply be motivated to engage in environmental 
proactivity because they believe it is the right thing to do from a moral or ethical 
standpoint (Bansal and Roth, 2000). We can reasonably expect that if managers are 
motivated by ecological responsibility this will lead to greater environmental 
proactivity. That is, if a manager believes that environmental proactivity is important 
and the right thing to do, then this will be related to environmental proactivity within 
the organization. 
H2: An ecological responsibility motivation will be positively related to  
environmental proactivity. 
 
Stakeholder Pressure and Environmental Proactivity 
We define stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46), or 
in other words, as someone who has a stake in the organization. Ultimately, these 
stakeholders pose various institutional pressures (i.e., coercive, normative, and 
mimetic pressures) that motivate firms to enhance or limit environmental proactivity 
(Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas, 2001; Hart, 2005; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; 





Sharma and Henriques, 2005). In theory, all stakeholders are important to an 
organization, but in reality, firms must necessarily limit the importance they can 
attach to various stakeholder groups (Jamali, 2008; Lee, 2011). Indeed, researchers 
have noted that some stakeholders are of higher importance than others (Davis and 
Thompson, 1994; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997).  
Researchers studying emerging markets have theorized that stakeholder 
pressures are stronger in developed than in developing markets where social and 
environmental responsibility are of less importance to stakeholders in general (Gao, 
2009; Li and Zhang, 2010; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Ye and Zhang, 2011). 
However, we know of little empirical research that supports this contention or 
research that shows how pressures might differ per stakeholder group. Indeed, even 
within China we can expect differences in stakeholder pressures across geographic 
areas. For example, local residents in some urban areas of China may have higher 
environmental awareness due to variance in institutional and economic variances 
across regions	  (Huang et al., 2006; Liu and Lu, 2002). However, overall, internal and 
societal stakeholders have yet to play a strong role in terms of monitoring business’ 
environmental activities (Tang and Zhan, 2008; Yang, 2005).  
By nature, external stakeholders (e.g., consumers, suppliers, competitors, trade 
associations, banks, etc.) are limited in their capacities to influence firm behaviour 
through external and indirect means (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). That is, they must 
be perceived as important by internal (or regulatory) stakeholders who have the ability 
to influence firm behaviour. External stakeholders seeking to influence firm 
environmental proactivity may do so through strict contract or purchase requirements, 
protests, boycotts, negative media attention, and through attempts to intensify 
regulatory requirements, exerting coercive pressures on firms. Firms seeking to avoid 





negative public attention may then be driven toward greater environmental proactivity 
(Bansal and Roth, 2000) by showing their external stakeholders (e.g., consumers, 
suppliers) green profiles (Arora and Cason, 1996).  
Research in China has found that external stakeholders from developed 
countries are pressuring Chinese firms in their supply chain to increase their 
environmental performance (Lai and Wong, 2012; Zhu et al., 2007). In addition, both 
international and local customers in China are increasingly demanding greater 
environmental proactivity from Chinese firms (e.g., Lau and Waldmeir, 2010; Sarkis 
et al., 2011; Yuan et al., 2006). Accordingly, we predict that perceived pressures from 
external stakeholders will be related to greater environmental proactivity: 
H3: Perceived external stakeholder pressure will be positively related to 
environmental proactivity. 
 
Regulatory stakeholders include government officials with the power and 
authority to create and enforce environmental standards (Darnall et al., 2010; Fineman 
and Clarke, 1996; Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012). Firms are likely to place high 
importance on regulatory stakeholders as failure to comply with regulatory demands 
can result in potential liabilities, fines, penalties, and clean-up costs (Bansal and 
Clelland, 2004). Furthermore, managers may perceive pressure from regulatory 
stakeholders because of the potential organizational benefits that can be obtained from 
compliance and working relationships with government. For example, environmental 
proactivity has been shown to offer regulatory advantages by leading to greater 
flexibility to adapt to legislative changes (Bansal and Bogner, 2002), the ability to 
influence environmental laws and regulations (Faucheux et al., 1998; Hart, 1995; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000), and to reduce or avoid legal 
liabilities (Hart, 1995; Rooney, 1993). 





Recently, environmental management has been one of the top issues on the 
political agenda for government in China (Francesch-Huidobro et al., 2012; Yuan et 
al., 2006). Governments at different levels (e.g., central, provinces, cities, and 
counties) have launched a series of regulatory policies and market-based approaches 
in order to motivate corporations to implement environmental management (Lo and 
Fryxell, 2005; Ma and Ortolano 2000; Tang et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, we predict that perceived pressures from regulatory stakeholders will be 
related to greater environmental proactivity: 
H4: Perceived regulatory stakeholder pressure will be positively related to 
environmental proactivity. 
 
Environmental Proactivity and Competitive Advantage 
 Research examining the financial benefits to environmental performance has 
tended to examine three main areas of competitive advantage: cost, reputation and 
innovation (e.g., Delmas et al., 2011). Research done in developed countries has 
found that environmental performance can reduce costs by lowering compliance 
costs, reducing waste, improving efficiency and productivity, and reducing or 
avoiding legal liabilities (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Hart, 1995; Hart and Ahuja, 
1996; Rooney, 1993). Research has also found that environmental performance can 
strengthen firm reputation both directly (Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000), and 
indirectly through greater appeal to consumers (Miles and Covin, 2000), 
improvements in legitimacy (Bansal and Clelland, 2004), and through the ability to 
influence environmental laws and regulations (Faucheux et al., 1998; Hart, 1995; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Miles and Covin, 2000). Lastly, environmental performance 
can lead to a competitive advantage related to innovation through product 
differentiation (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Porter and van der Linde, 1995), the selling 
of pollution control technology (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008), the creation of entry 





barriers (Dean and Brown, 1995; Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), and the 
development of new market opportunities and better access to markets (Ambec and 
Lanoie, 2008). Whether these effects occur in a developing market remains unclear, 
and in particular, we know of no research that has empirically examined the 
relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive advantage in the 
largest emerging market, China (Ye and Zhang, 2011). 
 Within China, as compared to most Western countries, firms tend to operate in 
a fiercely low-cost external business environment. That is, currently China’s main 
competitive advantage is its low-cost environment, established primarily through 
relatively low wages. Since costs are already extremely low, it is likely to be highly 
difficult to gain further cost advantages through environmental proactivity. We do, 
however, still believe it is possible, but only when managers are ecologically 
motivated.     
 If top management’s drive for environmental proactivity stems from an 
ecological instead of a competitive motivation, the organizational culture and 
leadership would be significantly different. That is, employees may recognize that a 
firm’s environmental proactivity is not simply another means for management to 
minimize costs, but is part of the organizational norm and something top management 
believes as being the right thing to do (Bansal and Roth, 2000). This recognition and 
ultimate embracement of environmental proactivity may then, paradoxically, result in 
additional cost savings. Such cost savings may result from an organizational culture 
that recognizes and rewards (financially or otherwise) ecological responsibility. 
Likewise, this culture and leadership may drive mangers to make necessary short-term 
investments to gain longer-term ecological and financial benefits. For example, 
managers might be willing to purchase more efficient technology despite the upfront 





costs. Managers may also be more receptive to taking risks to further their 
environmental proactivity as they feel obligated to do so based on their belief that it is 
the right or ethical thing to do. Lastly, within such a culture employees are likely to be 
more receptive to, and aware of finding, additional means to furthering environmental 
proactivity. In sum, through the impact on managers and employees (Mayer et al., 
2009; Sharma, 2000; Somers, 2001), firms within China with ecologically motivated 
senior executives may gain a cost competitive advantage to environmental proactivity 
H5: The interaction between environmental proactivity and cost advantage 
will have a positive association with ecological motivations. 
 
 In contrast, to gain a reputation advantage in China, we believe that firms must 
be competitively motivated. In a systematic review of the corporate reputation 
literature Walker (2010) noted that the most commonly used definition of reputation 
comes from Fombrun (1996: 72) who defined it as “A perceptual representation of a 
company’s past actions and future prospects that describes the firm’s overall appeal to 
all of its key constituents when compared with other leading rivals”. This definition 
clearly states that reputation is based on a comparison to rivals.  
Accordingly, we believe that in order to gain a reputation advantage from 
environmental proactivity managers need to be motivated by competition so that they 
are always seeking to outperform their competitors, and are thus perceived as more 
environmentally proactive to stakeholders. This is likely to result in a constant one-
upping as these externally driven managers seek to have higher environmental 
proactivity than rivals. Two points arise from this observation. First, because a firm’s 
reputation is based on stakeholders’ expectations derived from a comparison to 
“leading rivals” (Fombrun, 1996), if a firm is continuously outperforming the 
environmental proactivity of competitors, they are likely to gain a reputation 
advantage. Second, it is possible that for managers that are competitively motivated 





their environmental proactivity is more symbolic than substantive (Walker and Wan, 
2012), meaning they can gain a perceived reputational advantage but not a cost 
advantage.  
H6: The interaction between environmental proactivity and reputation 
advantage will have a positive association with competitive motivations.  
 
 Lastly, while we believe that both cost and reputational advantages to 
environmental proactivity will occur in China depending on managerial motivations, 
we do not predict advantages related to greater innovation. In general, China has not 
to date demonstrated an ability to develop world leading innovative green products or 
services. In fact, if anything the opposite is true where Western firms have struggled 
to maintain their environmentally responsible image when working with Chinese 
firms that tend to have a poor environmental image (Lai and Wong, 2012). 
Accordingly, we do not make a hypothesis for the relationship between environmental 
proactivity and innovation. Despite the lack of a hypothesis we keep innovation in the 
study as a non-significant relationship would be in contrast to findings in Western 
countries (e.g., Delmas et al., 2011), and thus interesting in its own right.  
Method 
Context 
This study was conducted in Zigong, a prefecture-level city of Sichuan 
province in southwest China. China, one of the major industrializing countries with 
rapid economic development in the past thirty years, is faced with a dilemma of 
significant resource and environmental constraints. This is more evident in our 
research site area, which is geographically distant from other major cities in China. 
The city is well known for having varied manufacturing industries such as natural gas, 
coal, inorganic chemicals, and salt production, thus it provides excellent research 
facilities for understanding corporate environmental management by Chinese firms.  





There is very little publicly available data on the environmental proactivity of 
Chinese firms in general, and within the manufacturing industry in the province of 
Sichuan there is also no publicly available data on corporate financial performance. 
That is, there is no reliable secondary data available on environmental proactivity, its 
antecedents, or its consequences. Accordingly, we collected primary data through 
surveys with a multi-item scheme and with multiple respondents per firm (Delmas et 
al. 2011).  
We first obtained the complete company directory through the Bureau of 
Commerce of Zigong (BCZ). After dropping firms that were not accessible or had 
gone through bankruptcy, a total of 330 companies were included in the survey and 
questionnaires were sent to them facilitated by BCZ, the Zigong Branch of Chengdu 
Customs, and Zigong Environmental Protection Bureau (it is common to conduct 
surveys in China through government authorities in order to increase response rates). 
In order to minimize the risk of common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), for 
each company we used multiple respondents as we sought information on 
environmental proactivity from environmental managers, and information on 
competitive advantage, motivations and stakeholder pressures from top managers, 
respectively. Environmental managers are in the best position to explain their 
environmental strategy and managerial discretion as it relates to the natural 
environment, and as the key decision makers top managers are in the best position to 
explain the financial benefits, their motivations for environmental proactivity and 
stakeholder pressures. 
Some of the surveyed firms had specific people in charge of environmental 
management (e.g., with titles such as departmental managers of environmental 
management, general managers in charge of environmental management, etc.). For 





those without specific titles set up for environmental management, managers with the 
best knowledge of internal environmental management (e.g., product managers, 
project managers, R&D managers, security managers, etc.) filled out the 
questionnaires. Top managers included vice-presidents, chairpersons, general 
managers, or owners. Lastly, we dropped firms from the analysis that returned 
questionnaires answered by single respondents, leaving us with a final usable data of 
161 valid observations (response rate = 48.8%). That is, our final sample consisted of 
322 participants in 161 firms. 
The average age of our managers was 36 years old, 55 percent were male and 
45 percent female, and over 80 percent had a University education at minimum. 
Regarding their work experience, the mean number of years participants were with 
their current company was six, the mean number of years they were in their current 
position was five, and the mean number of years of managerial experience was six 
and a half. 
We developed each construct discussed in detail below based on work from 
previous scholars (Darnall et al., 2010; Delmas et al., 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and 
Ehrenfeld, 1997; Welford, 1998), and a pilot test of 27 Chinese firms within our 
specific research context. Lastly, prior to the pilot test we also asked industry experts 
within China to check the face validity of our constructs for our setting (Delmas et al. 
2011). To test the validity of dependent and independent variables we performed 
exploratory factor analyses using principle component analysis with Varimax rotation.  
Dependent Variables   
 Environmental Proactivity. A proactive environmental strategy is 
characterized by a strong commitment to the natural environment going significantly 
beyond legal requirements. This commitment is often demonstrated and measured 





through environmental operational improvements (e.g, waste reduction, closed-loop 
systems, life-cycle analysis, employee training) and environmental reporting (e.g., 
internal and external accounting procedures, environmental indicators and goals, 
sustainability reports) (Darnall et al. 2010; Delmas et al. 2011; Hart, 2005; Nash and 
Ehrenfeld, 1997; Welford, 1998). Within these two broad measures we developed a 
number of survey questions. Using a factor analysis we identified two valid 
constructs, both of which had a single Eigen value above 1 and alpha’s of .70. The 
first construct consisted of four items. It focused on environmental operational 
improvements and asked respondents questions such as: Do you have an internal 
assessment of the environmental impact of operations? Do you conduct a 
comprehensive internal environmental audit? The second construct also consisted of 
four items. It focused on environmental reporting and asked respondents questions 
such as: Do you have environmental performance indicators/goals? Do you have a 
formal environmental performance reporting system?    
Competitive Advantage. The effect of environmental strategy on competitive 
advantage has been examined by a number of authors (Christmann, 2000; Delmas et 
al., 2011; Russo and Fouts, 1997). Given that financial performance data, and in 
particular accounting measures, were not available for the firms in our sample we 
used constructs developed by Delmas et al (2011) and added survey questions more 
particular to our research context where applicable.  
 Competitive advantage was measured via three constructs: cost advantage, 
reputation and innovation (Delmas et al., 2011). The examination of three areas of 
competitive advantage permits a more nuanced investigation into the financial 
benefits of environmental responsibility (Barnet, 2007). Each item was measured 
using a 7-point Likert-type scale; all constructs had a single Eigen value above one, 





and the alpha’s for competitive advantage, reputation and innovation were as follows: 
.73, .70 and .76 respectively.  
 The competitive advantage construct consisted of four items examining both 
domestic and foreign competitors and asked respondents questions such as: We incur 
lower compliance costs with regulations of environmental issues relative to our 
domestic competitors; Overall, our environmental strategy improves our relative cost 
position to foreign competitors. 
 The reputation construct consisted of two items and measured reputation 
according to consumers (Delmas et al., 2011). The questions asked respondents to rate 
the loyalty of existing customers and the attraction of new customers. 
 The innovation construct consisted of three items and asked respondents about 
technology development, the development of new, or improvements in existing, 
processes and operations, and the development of new, or improvements of existing 
products. 
Independent Variables 
 Motivations. Building off the qualitative research of Bansal and Roth (2000) 
we developed scale items for two environmental motivations: competitive and 
ecological responsibility.  
Each item in our motivation variables were measured using a 7-point Likert-
type scale; both constructs had a single Eigen value above one, and the alpha’s for a 
competitive and an ecological motivation were as follows: .82 and .65 respectively. 
The competitive motivation construct consisted of three items and asked 
respondents questions such as: I chose to invest in environmental responsibilities that 
will secure my firm with the highest returns; Environmental initiatives must be 
commercially viable for me to invest in them. The ecological motivation construct 





consisted of four items and asked respondents questions such as: Firms have a 
responsibility to invest in environmental initiatives; My company is environmentally 
responsible because it is the right thing to do. 
 Stakeholder Pressure. The perceptions of managers are of critical importance 
to understanding stakeholder influence and pressure (Banerjee, 2001; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Fineman and Clarke, 1996). In turn, managerial perceptions of the 
stakeholder pressures then influence firm strategy (Darnall et al., 2010; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Fineman and Clarke, 1996; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999). 
Correspondingly, using our survey we asked managers to rate the perceived pressures 
from various stakeholders. 
Given the context of our research in the province of Sichuan we focused on 
external and regulatory stakeholders as per our hypotheses for stakeholder pressures. 
Within China both internal (i.e., employees) and societal stakeholders (i.e., general 
public, NGOs, unions, etc.) yield little power regarding the use of CSR practices of 
firms (Lin, 2010; Tsoi, 2010). Importantly, this was confirmed in our data as we 
included multiple groups of stakeholders but they did not produce valid or reliable 
constructs. 
  Each construct was measured using a 7-point Likert-type scale where 
respondents were asked to rate the importance of various stakeholders. Both 
stakeholder pressure constructs had a single Eigen value above one, and the alpha’s 
for external and regulatory stakeholder pressures were as follows: .74 and .70 
respectively. External stakeholders included customers, suppliers, trade associations, 
competitors and banks. Regulatory stakeholders included all three levels of 
government relevant to our research context: municipal, provincial and central. 
Control Variables  





 Firm size. Size was included because larger firms tend to pollute more, and 
studies have found that larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to integrate 
environmental practices into their organizations (Chen, Lai and Wen, 2006; Lopez-
Gamero, Claver-Cortes and Molina-Azorin, 2008; Moore, 2001; Russo and Fouts, 
1997). In addition, previous research has used size as a proxy for firm visibility as 
highly visible companies are often under increased scrutiny from stakeholders 
(Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Brammer and Millington, 2008). Increased firm 
visibility could lead to higher costs associated with increased taxation, fines and 
litigation for example. It might also lead to increased environmental responsibility as 
these firms seek to appease the increased demands from stakeholders and to avoid or 
pre-empt environmental legislation (Brammer and Millington, 2008). Firm size was 
measured as the total number of employees (Darnall et al., 2010).  
In addition, we partly controlled for firm size by only including firms with 
more than 50 employees. We also created a measure for firm size which was broken 
down within our sample as follows: 56 percent had between 51-100 employees, 30 
percent had between 101-500 employees; six percent had between 501-1000 
employees, and eight percent had between 1001-5000 employees. 
 Export orientation. Firms with greater export orientation may benefit from 
showing their commitment to environmental protection because this may boost the 
confidence of foreign customers (Christmann and Taylor, 2001; Darnall et al., 2010). 
It was measured by following Darnall et al. (2010) by surveying whether the firm’s 
market scope was local (i.e., export orientation =1), national (i.e., export orientation 
=2), regional (i.e., export orientation =3), or global (i.e., export orientation =4). This 
construct ranged from 1 to 4, with a mean value of 1.99 and a standard deviation of 
.97. 





 Firm age. Older firms have been shown to have greater environmental 
responsibility (Darnall et al., 2010; Portney and Stavins, 2000). Age was measured as 
the number of years in operation. The age range in our sample was from 1-73, with a 
mean age of 14 years and a standard deviation of 12. 
 Industry type. Dummy variables were used to control for industry type. 
Seventy-five percent of the firms in our sample were in manufacturing and 25 percent 
in service. 
 Family business. Family businesses have been found to be more socially and 
environmentally responsible than their peers (Sharma and Sharma, 2011). Only eight 
percent of the companies in our sample were family run businesses. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics and correlations for our study variables are shown in 
Table I. 
-------------------------------------------------- 




 To test Hypotheses 1 and 2—which predicted that a competitive and an 
ecological responsibility motivation would be positively related to environmental 
proactivity—we ran linear regressions across both our measures of environmental 
proactivity (environmental operational improvements and environmental reporting) as 
the dependent variables (see Table II). 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table II about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 





A competitiveness motivation was not related to either type of environmental 
proactivity, thus we did not find support for Hypothesis 1. In contrast, ecological 
responsibility had a significant positive relationship to both measures of 
environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements (p < .01) and 
environmental reporting (p < .10). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported 
Stakeholder Pressure 
 To test Hypotheses 3 and 4—which predicted that perceived external and 
regulatory stakeholder pressure would be positively related to environmental 
proactivity—we ran linear regressions across both our measures of environmental 
proactivity as the dependent variables (see Table II). 
 External stakeholder pressure was not significantly related to environmental 
operational improvements, and it had a significant negative relationship to 
environmental reporting (p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
 Regulatory stakeholder pressure had a significant positive relationship to both 
measures of environmental proactivity: Environmental operational improvements (p < 
.10) and environmental reporting (p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported. 
 The results for our antecedents to environmental proactivity are displayed in 
Figure 2. 
-------------------------------------------------- 




To test Hypotheses 5 and 6 for the moderating effects of motivations we ran 
four regressions that tested the interactions of motivation and environmental 
proactivity by both types of competitive advantage: cost advantage and reputation   
(see Table III). In addition, we included innovation to test the null hypothesis of no 





significant relationship among motivation, environmental proactivity and innovation. 
Since we did not form a hypothesis we do not show the result in the Table, but as 
predicted it was not significant.  
We found three significant interactions (see Table III). First, the interaction 
between one environmental proactivity measure (i.e., environmental operational 
improvements) and an ecological responsibility motivation was significant and 
positive for cost advantage (p < .01). We further examined this significant interaction 
by plotting it in Figure 3 (Aiken and West, 1991). The plotted interaction shows that 
for managers of firms with an ecological motivation as their environmental 
operational improvements increased their perceived cost advantage increased. This is 
in contrast to managers that are not ecologically motivated who perceived a decreased 
cost advantage as their environmental operational improvements increased. This 
significant interaction indicates that while the relationship between environmental 
operational improvements and cost advantage is not significant, if the managers of a 
firm are environmentally proactive (measured through operational improvements) and 
they are ecologically motivated, there is a perceived positive and significant cost 
advantage. 
-------------------------------------------------- 




Insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Second, the interaction between the other measure of environmental 
proactivity (i.e., environmental reporting) and an ecological responsibility motivation 
was also significant and positive for cost advantage (p < .01). We further examined 
this significant interaction by plotting it in Figure 4 (Aiken and West, 1991). The 





plotted interaction shows that for managers in firms with an ecological motivation, as 
their environmental reporting increased their perceived cost advantage increased. This 
is in contract to managers of firms that are not ecologically motivated who perceived 
a decreased cost advantage as their environmental proactivity increased. Taking these 
two significant interactions together, we find support for hypothesis H5 that proposed 
that an ecological motivation would positively moderate the impact of environmental 
proactivity on cost advantage.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Third, consistent with Hypothesis H6, the interaction between environmental 
proactivity and a competitive motivation was significant and positive for reputation (p 
< .05). However, it only occurred to environmental operational improvements and not 
to environmental reporting. We further examined the significant interaction by 
plotting it in Figure 5 (Aiken and West, 1991). The plotted interaction shows that for 
managers in firms with a competitive motivation, as their environmental operational 
improvements increased their perceived reputation advantage increased. This is in 
contrast to managers in firms that are not competitively motivated who perceived a 
decreased reputation advantage as their environmental proactivity increased. Thus we 
obtain partial support for Hypothesis 6 in that a competitive motivation did moderate 
the relationship between environmental operational improvements and a perceived 
reputation advantage, but this relationship did not exist for environmental reporting. 
-------------------------------------------------- 









 Our results support the research contention that environmental proactivity is a 
multi-dimensional construct and that the one-size-fits-all approach to environmental 
management and research is limited and misleading (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci and 
King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008). Such support is evident in two ways: 
First, our data indicates the existence of two types of environmental proactivity with 
similarities and differences in regards to their respective antecedents and 
consequences. Second, our results delineate notable differences between 
environmental proactivity in Western societies versus that in China. We examine the 
latter point throughout the discussion. 
 We found that both an ecologically responsible motivation and perceived 
regulatory stakeholder pressure had a significant positive relationship to both types of 
environmental proactivity. The first finding indicates that in contrast to motivations 
driven by competitiveness those driven by ecological responsibility further a firm’s 
environmental proactivity. A large amount of research examining environmental 
proactivity in Western countries has tried to encourage greater firm proactivity by 
empirically identifying the financial benefits to doing so (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; 
Hart, 1995; Miles and Covin, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Porter and van der Linde, 
1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). However, our research of Chinese firms demonstrates 
that a competitive motivation does not increase environmental proactivity. Only firms 
that are ecologically driven have a significant and positive relationship to 
environmental proactivity. Furthermore, the financial benefits measured through a 
cost advantage appear to be attainable only when the firm is ecologically motivated 
(as identified through our interaction effects). That is, there were no direct 
relationships between our two types of environmental proactivity and cost advantage, 
but when ecologically motivated, both types were related to significant cost 





advantages. Thus, Chinese managers seeking to gain cost advantages over their 
competitors through their environmental proactivity must be motivated by the belief 
that it is the right thing to do from a moral and ethical standpoint. It is possible that 
without this motivation managers seek short cuts or are not fully committed to 
environmental proactivity resulting in an inability to obtain any cost advantages. 
 Research has consistently found that government regulations can lead to 
environmental proactivity (e.g., Marcus and Geffen, 1998; Majumdar and Marcus, 
2001). It would appear that this effect also applies to China as perceived regulatory 
stakeholder pressure had a significant and positive relationship to both types of 
environmental proactivity. Through coercive pressures governments can motivate 
environmental proactivity. This finding again demonstrates the ability of governments 
to enforce environmental proactivity, as consistent with previous studies on corporate 
environmental management of Chinese firms (Zhang et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2007).   
 Contrary to what we hypothesized, perceived external stakeholder pressure 
was negatively related to environmental reporting and not related to environmental 
operational improvements. While researchers have found that external stakeholders 
from developed countries are pressuring Chinese firms in their supply chain to 
increase their environmental performance (Lai and Wong, 2012; Zhu et al., 2007), we 
did not find evidence of this in our data. It may be that the specific external 
stakeholders examined in our data (customers, suppliers, trade associations, 
competitors and banks) are price driven and Chinese managers feel pressure to keep 
costs as low as possible. For example, Chinese managers may not want to invest in 
employee environmental training or internal and external environmental accounting 
(items in our constructs) as such activities will increase short-term costs. Thus, even 
though environmental proactivity may result in cost savings over time through things 





such as waste reduction and closed-loop systems, given the short-term costs of 
implementation managers may not have been willing to invest the necessary amount 
of firm resources given external stakeholder pressures for minimal costs.  
Arguably, our most interesting findings relate to the examination of the 
relationship between environmental proactivity and competitive advantage as tested in 
the interaction effect terms. First, as expected, we did not find any signification 
relationship between motivation, environmental proactivity and innovation. This 
demonstrates the limited value of environmental proactivity related to innovation for 
our sampled Chinese firms.  
Second, to gain a reputation advantage through environmental proactivity 
senior managers must be competitively motivated. This finding is entirely consistent 
with the most commonly used definition of reputation (Walker, 2010) provided by 
Fombrun (1996: 72) that implies competition with rivals. Given this conceptualization 
of reputation it is not surprising that a reputational advantage to environmental 
proactivity occurs when managers are competitively motivated. In other words, in 
order to gain a reputation advantage, managers need to be motivated by competition 
so that they are always seeking to do more than their competitors and are thus 
perceived as the more environmental proactive firm to stakeholders.  
Third, two significant interactions were identified between environmental 
proactivity and cost advantage, which demonstrated that in order to gain a cost 
competitive advantage through either type of environmental proactivity firms must be 
ecologically motivated. This relationship is of particular interest given that we did not 
find a significant direct relationship between environmental proactivity and cost 
competitive advantage. Without being motivated by ecological responsibility 
managers may not be willing to make the necessary short-term investments to 





ultimately gain a cost advantage over competitors. The paradox of these two findings 
is that to gain a cost advantage managers cannot be motivated by competition, only by 
ecological responsibility. Managers of firms that do gain a cost advantage to their 
environmental proactivity will no doubt be pleased, but interestingly this is not why 
they are engaged in environmental proactivity in the first place. It may be the case that 
when top managers state that their motivation for environmental proactivity is ethical 
or moral employees are more likely to embrace the proactivity as it filters down the 
organization. This embracement may then result in additional cost savings as various 
employees find the means through which to continue to improve the firm’s 
environmental proactivity. Similarly, with the support of top management the 
organizational culture will be strongly supportive of environmental proactivity. 
Perhaps, only with a culture that embraces environmental proactivity as the ethical or 
moral thing to do, are firms able to gain a cost competitive advantage. 
Implications 
Research implications. For researchers our implications are threefold: First, 
with a dearth of research examining environmental proactivity in emerging markets 
our research in China demonstrates the existence of environmental proactivity 
(meaning a non-zero value for the measure) and some compelling differences and 
similarities with research results from emerged markets. Given that both emerged and 
emerging countries will need to be a part of the discussions and ultimate solutions to 
global environmental problems such as climate change, our research demonstrates 
that we have much to learn about environmental proactivity in emerging countries.  
Second, our research supports the contention that environmental management 
is not a universal prescription or a one-size-fits-all approach (Barnett, 2007; Berchicci 
and King, 2007; Brammer and Millington, 2008). We found evidence of two types of 





environmental proactivity that had similarities and differences with regards to the 
antecedents and consequences of proactivity, and some notable differences between 
environmental proactivity in Western societies versus that in China. Differences 
included (1) a non-significant relationship between a competitive motivation and 
environmental proactivity, (2) a negative relationship between external stakeholders 
and environmental proactivity, (3) a non-significant relationship between 
environmental proactivity and innovation, (4) a non-significant relationship between 
environmental proactivity and a cost advantage but a significant relationship when 
ecologically motivated, and (5) a non-significant relationship between environmental 
proactivity and a reputation advantage but a significant relationship (to operational 
improvements specifically) when competitively motivated. Furthermore, the use of 
multiple forms of competitive advantage was substantiated in that we obtained very 
different results across cost, reputation and innovation.  
Third, we uncovered a paradox where managers must be motivated by 
ecological responsibility to gain a perceived cost advantage. This is a compelling 
result as it differs from research examining Western organizations, and provides 
opportunities for future research to begin to examine this paradox in greater detail. 
For example, does this paradox exist in other parts of China? Can we empirically 
identify the reasons for its occurrence? Given that our results were self-reported, is the 
perceived cost advantage actual, or are managers that engage in environmental 
proactivity because they believe it is the right thing to do overly optimistic on the 
financial benefits? 
 Managerial implications. For managers our implications are threefold: First, 
both our measures of environmental proactivity are related to a cost competitive 
advantage, but to obtain it, top managers must paradoxically be motivated by 





ecological responsibility, not competition. Managers seeking to gain a cost advantage 
must create a culture that believes in environmental proactivity because it is the right 
thing to do (Bansal and Roth, 2000), and not because they seek to minimize costs. 
Second, while there was no direct relationship between environmental operational 
improvements and a reputation competitive advantage, managers can gain this 
advantage as long as they are motivated by competition. Therefore, managers cannot 
gain a cost advantage when their environmental proactivity is motivated by 
competition, but they can gain a reputation advantage. Third, we found no significant 
relationships related to innovation. Knowing this, if managers could conscientiously 
attempt to further innovation through environmental proactivity they could potentially 
be in unique possession of an innovation competitive advantage.  
 Policy implications. For policy makers our implications are threefold: First, if 
your goal is to increase the environmental proactivity in China you are succeeding in 
that the managers in our sample felt pressured by regulatory stakeholders to become 
proactive. Second, in making appeals to further corporate environmental proactivity, 
our data suggests that the best means to do so would be to make arguments that it is 
the ethical or moral thing to do (ecological responsibility). Arguments based on 
competition, such as arguing that it will improve the bottom-line, are not strongly 
supported in our data. Paradoxically, arguments based on ethical or moral appeals can 
be sold by stating that only with such motivation can competitive gains in cost be 
obtained. Third, the lack of any significant relationships to an innovation competitive 
advantage should be troubling to policy makers in China. Firm innovation is 
necessary for competitiveness and if Chinese firms are not innovating as it relates to 
environmental proactivity it may mean that they are seeking such innovation 





elsewhere. Policy makers may want to create policies to encourage home grown 
environmental innovation.     
Limitations and Future Research 
 Our study had two main limitations. First, we discussed our results as though 
they were representative of all of China. However, our findings are specific to the city 
of Zigong located in the Sichuan province in southwest China, and they may not 
generalize beyond this location. That said, we purposely selected Zigong given that 
this area typifies most corporations (including small and medium sized enterprises) in 
such a transitional economy and their felt pressures or motivations related to proactive 
environmental management practices. Future research will have to investigate other 
parts of China to see if our results are generalizable.  
 Second, there was no archival and publicly available data for any of our 
measures within our study context, and it was therefore necessary to use cross-
sectional survey data. While such data has its advantages over archival publicly 
available data (Delmas et al., 2011) we were not able to conduct a longitudinal 
investigation or use more objective measures for our constructs. In the future, 
researchers may be in a position to examine environmental proactivity longitudinally 
and perhaps using secondary data within our study context.  
Conclusion 
 We empirically identified a number of antecedents and consequences to 
environmental proactivity in China. In particular, we found that ecological 
motivations and regulatory stakeholder pressure were positively related to both types 
of environmental proactivity, and that external stakeholder pressure was negatively 
related to environmental reporting. Furthermore, we found that (1) if a firm was 
environmentally proactive (as it relates to either measure) and they were ecologically 





motivated, there was a positive and significant cost advantage, and (2) if a firm makes 
use of environmental operational improvement and they were competitively 
motivated, there was a positive and significant reputation advantage. 
Despite being the world’s second largest economy, the largest emitter of 
carbon dioxide, and a country that burns twice as much coal as the United States 
(Gore, 2009), we know surprisingly little about environmental proactivity in China. 
One of the most influential Chinese spiritual leaders Lao Tzu stated “A journey of a 
thousand miles must begin with a single step” (Dyer, 2008). We hope our study sheds 
light on this journey, as China’s involvement in global environmental proactivity is a 
must if we are to overcome the major environmental problems we face today. 
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